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INTRODUCTION

Currently in South Carolina, there is no period of time during which a birth
parent may withdraw consent after signing a consent form giving a child up for
adoption, absent a showing that there was an element of duress or coercion
present at the time the form was signed.' Nor is there a waiting period after the
birth of the child before a parent may sign a consent form giving a child up for
adoption.2 North Carolina and Georgia also allow withdrawal of consent, but
unlike South Carolina, the first few days of their withdrawal periods do not
require a showing of duress or coercion in order for the birth parents to withdraw
consent. 3
In light of the duress standard set forth in McCann v. Doe, South Carolina
should adopt statutory measures to give a birth parent a period of time to
4
withdraw consent for adoption without proving duress or coercion.
Furthermore, South Carolina law currently provides waiting periods for other
important family planning decisions, which allow individuals to take time to
review the life changing and potentially permanent consequences of these

1.
2.
3.
4.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-350 (2010).
McCann v. Doe, 377 S.C. 373, 383, 660 S.E.2d 500, 506 (2008).
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-9(b) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-706(a) (2013).
377 S.C. 373, 660 S.E.2d 500 (2008).
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decisions. For example, before two people can get married they must submit a
written application and then wait twenty-four hours before the license is issued.
As another example, before a woman can have an abortion performed, she must
make an appointment to receive written information about the procedure, sign a
form indicating that she has received this information, and then wait at least
twenty-four hours before undergoing the procedure.6 Presumably, these waiting
periods are designed to give people the opportunity to review these kinds of
decisions so that they may enter into them fully informed and fully committed,
and hopefully not regret their ultimate decision. The court in McCann v. Doe
notes that although biological parents must wait forty-eight hours after receiving
a brochure from the Department of Social Services to place their child with the
Department for adoption, and that biological parents are given time to decide if
they are going to use the Department or a private agency, "there is no similar
provision giving parents time to reflect on the more important decision of
relinquishment." Although there is a waiting period for parents when choosing
the adoption agency, there is no similar period after a birth parent signs the
consent form giving a child up for adoption during which the parent can
withdraw that consent without a statutorily defined reason. Currently, it appears
that this withdrawal period is looked upon favorably by the judiciary of South
Carolina.9 A short period of at least twenty-four hours, and perhaps no more
than three days, during which consent may be withdrawn absent a showing of
duress or coercion would not place an undue burden on the adoption system,
would help ensure the finality of a birth parent's decision to place a child for
adoption, and would help further the ultimate goal of adoption laws-to make
sure that serving the best interests of the child is at the forefront of adoption
decisions.10
This Note discusses the current statutory and case law regarding consent for
adoption and withdrawal of that consent in South Carolina, with a specific look
at the evolution of the definition of duress, and draws upon current examples of
other states and the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 to provide suggestions for
the legislature. Part II examines the current South Carolina statutes and
provisions related to the signing and withdrawal of consent. The first section
discusses the elements needed to sign the consent form relinquishing a child for

5.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-220 (2014).
6.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330(C) (2002 & Supp. 2014).
7.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) ("In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State
furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed.").
8.
McCann, 377 S.C. at 384 n.6, 600 S.E.2d at 506 n.6.
9.
See id.
10. Id. at 389, 660 S.E.2d at 509 (quoting Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 365, 367, 380 S.E.2d 836,
837 (1989)) ("The best interest of the child remains, always, the paramount consideration in every
adoption.").
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adoption, as well as what is required for the birth parent to withdraw such
consent. The second section examines several important cases that have shaped
the current standards for withdrawing consent. Part III details the standard of
duress that a birth parent currently must overcome in order to withdraw consent,
and analyzes McCann v. Doe, a recent South Carolina case that hinged on the
court's finding of duress and the definition of duress that it set forth. Part IV
includes an overview of other states' provisions and cases that allow for a
withdrawal period, an examination of North Carolina and Georgia's statutory
provisions and case law, and an analysis of section 2-408 of the proposed
Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, to provide guidance on how South Carolina
might structure its own withdrawal period. Part V discusses why a withdrawal
period would be beneficial to South Carolina and makes recommendations for
the South Carolina legislature.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

South CarolinaSafeguard Statutes

Under South Carolina law, in order to withdraw consent for adoption, a birth
mother must give notice to the court that she wishes to withdraw consent and file
the reason that she is withdrawing consent, and all parties involved must have
the chance to speak on their behalf." In order to successfully revoke consent, a
birth parent must satisfy a two-prong test.12 First, the birth parent must prove
that she signed the consent form under duress or coercion, or that the decision
was involuntary.1 3 Second, the birth parent must demonstrate that the court's
decision to revoke the consent and place the child back with the birth mother is
in the child's best interest.1 4 However, as noted in South Carolina Code section
63-9-350 and confirmed in Hagy v. Pruitt, a birth parent's consent is irrevocable
once the final decree for adoption has been entered, 5 unless such consent has
been procured by fraud.16
There are current statutory safeguards in place to protect the birth parent
from signing a consent form involuntarily or while under duress or coercion.
Three steps must be taken in order to produce a valid consent form in South
Carolina. 17 First, two witnesses must be present when the birth parent signs the
consent form.' 8 There are three possible types of witnesses: a family court judge
from South Carolina, an attorney who is licensed in South Carolina and who is

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-350 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hagy v. Pruitt, 339 S.C. 425, 431, 529 S.E.2d714, 717 (2000).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-340 (2010).
Id. § 63-9-340(A).
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not a representative of the potential adoptive parents, or a person who is certified
by the State Department of Social Services.19 Second, each witness must sign a
document stating that before the consent form was signed, the birth parent was
fully informed about the provisions in the statute and attach the document to the
consent form.20

By signing and attaching that document, each witness is

asserting that he or she believes that the consent was completely voluntary and
was not given under duress or coercion.21 Finally, the birth parent giving
22
consent for adoption must receive a copy of these documents.
Recently, in Brown v. Harper,23 the South Carolina Court of Appeals strictly
construed these protective statutory requirements, stating that the requirements
24
must be fulfilled in order for the consent to be valid.
The court held that the
witnesses must be present, they must sign the affidavit, and there must be a
thorough discussion about the consent form before the form is signed. 25 In
Brown, the attorney that was one of the witnesses was not present when the birth
mother signed the consent form, and the attorney did not discuss the consent
form with the birth mother before she signed it; therefore, the consent for
26
adoption was invalid.
Thus, even though a birth parent may proceed with
actions pursuant to giving up a child for adoption, if the witness requirements are
not strictly followed, the adoption will be invalid.27
Although these
requirements should help prevent duress and involuntary consent, it is important
to note that an attorney does not have to be present when the birth parent signs
the consent form as long as the other two witness types are present, and the
absence of an attorney does not necessarily mean there will be a finding of
duress or coercion. 28
B. South Carolina Cases
Four cases have been instrumental in shaping the duress and consent
principles for adoption proceedings in South Carolina.29 A brief overview of
these cases shows that while the standard of duress has been instrumental as a

19. Id.
20. Id. § 63-9-340(B).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 63-9-340(C).
23. 409 S.C. 470, 761 S.E.2d 779 (Ct. App. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Baby Girl
Harper, 410 S.C. 446, 766 S.E.2d 375 (2014).
24. Id. at 472-74, 761 S.E.2d at 779-80 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 473, 761 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-340 (2010)).
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See Johnson v. Horry Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 298 S.C. 355, 356, 380 S.E.2d 830, 831
(1989).
29. Johnson, 298 S.C. at 355, 380 S.E.2d at 830; Gardner v. Baby Edward, 288 S.C. 322, 342
S.E.2d 601 (1986); Phillips v. Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985); Driggers v. Jolley, 219
S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
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safeguard for the best interest of the child in adoption cases, it is a murky and
difficult standard for birth parents to understand and overcome.
Driggers v. Jolley30 was an early case that set the tone for future adoption
cases in South Carolina. In Driggers,the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that the adoptive parents should continue to have custody of the child. 31 The
case involved the prospective adoption of a child where the birth parents, the
Jolleys, gave full custody of the child to the prospective adopting parents, the
Driggers.32 Subsequently, the Driggers filed for adoption of the child, and the
Jolleys filed a petition giving their consent for the adoption.33 However, three
months later, the Jolleys wanted to leave South Carolina and take the child with
them, so they sought to regain custody.34 The court acknowledged that an early
trend in the state permitted birth parents to freely withdraw consent before the
35
adoption was finalized.
However, the court decided to align itself with an
emerging trend and held that when the birth parents gave consent "freely and
knowingly," such consent "c[ould not] be arbitrarily withdrawn."36 This was
especially true, according to the court, when the adopting parents relied on
consent that was voluntarily given and "bonds of affection" had formed between
the child and the adopting parents. 37 Thus, this case established the baseline for
future adoption cases.
Phillips v. Baker,38 a case that was decided more than thirty years after
Driggers, examined both the "best interest of the child" prong the undercurrent
present in all adoption litigation-and whether consent is voluntary in order to
determine if withdrawal of consent was proper. 39 The court referred to a 1939
case about a contract claim that defined duress as "a condition of mind produced
by improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free
agency of a party and causes him to do an act or form a contract not of his own
volition." 40 The court noted that because the consent form was signed in the
presence of the birth mother's parents, her attorney, and a hospital social worker,
there was no duress and consent was voluntarily given.4 1 Although the court
found that there was no duress present here, namely that there were no external
pressures, this is at least somewhat suspect, as the birth mother was sixteen and

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
191 S.C.
41.

219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
Id. at 39, 64 S.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 33, 64 S.E.2d at 20.
Id.
Id. at 33-34, 64 S.E.2d at 20.
Id. at 37, 64 S.E.2d at 22.
Id.
Id.
284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985).
See id. at 135-37, 325 S.E.2d at 534-35 (citations omitted).
Id. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535 (quoting Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass and Cas. Co.,
177, 183, 4 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1939)).
See id. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
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unwed at the time of the baby's birth.42 Furthermore, the birth mother's father
"demonstrated a marked hostility towards her," making disparaging remarks
about the baby's bastardy and informing the birth mother that her baby "would
,43
not be welcome in his home." Thus, the fact that the birth mother's father was
present while she was signing the adoption consent form is perhaps a subtle form
of coercion.44
Nevertheless, the court chose to ignore this possibility,
demonstrating the limitations of the duress standard.
In Johnson v. Horry County Department of Social Services,45 the South
Carolina Supreme Court again concluded that the birth parent signed the consent
form for adoption without any signs of duress or coercion, and listed several
46
factors that contributed to this finding.
Paramount to the court's decision was
the fact that the birth mother "had an eleventh grade education and was able to
understand the documents she was signing.
Furthermore, "[s]he was not
under the influence of incapacitating drugs at the time of consent nor was she in
any unusual emotional state."4 8 The court also noted that the birth mother signed
the provisions in the document speaking to the voluntariness of consent.49
Notwithstanding those definitions of duress, the court made it quite clear in
Gardner v. Baby Edwardo that unless a birth parent specifically petitions the
court for withdrawal of consent and alleges duress or coercion, there will be a
presumption that the consent was voluntarily given, and the judge will not
inquire into the voluntariness of the consent during an adoption proceeding.5
Indeed, the court asserted that the trial judge does not have any "authority which
permits the trial judge to make this inquiry prior to entering an adoption
decree." 52 Therefore, the burden is on the birth parent to petition the court and
show that the decision to give consent for adoption was made either under duress
53
or coercion, or that the decision was involuntary in some way.
Although these cases provided an important foundational framework for
judges to look to when determining if the consent for adoption was given
voluntarily, duress remained a malleable concept open to judicial interpretation.
It was not until McCann v. Doe that the South Carolina Supreme Court provided

42. See id. at 135, 325 S.E.2d at 534.
43. Id. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 534.
44. See id. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535 (stating that both parents were present at the signing of
the consent form).
45. 298 S.C. 355, 380 S.E.2d 830 (1989).
46. Id. at 356, 380 S.E.2d at 831.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 288 S.C. 332, 342 S.E.2d 601 (1986).
51. See id. at 334, 342 S.E.2d at 603 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (1976); Phillips v.
Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985)).
52. Id.
53. McCann v. Doe, 377 S.C. 373, 384, 660 S.E.2d 500, 506 (2008).
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an example of what external pressures may provide a sufficient basis to
constitute duress.
III. ANALYSIS OF DURESS AND MCCANN V. DOE
A.

McCann v. Doe

A finding of duress is critical for a birth parent in adoption cases, but it is
notoriously difficult to prove. In many states, judges often apply a high standard
of proof when examining the facts to determine if a birth parent signed the
consent form under duress. Since there is no clearly demarcated list of
circumstances or factors that constitute duress, a finding of duress in a certain set
of facts for one judge may not result in a similar finding under another judge.54
McCann v. Doe is the most recent South Carolina case that has examined the
definition of duress and what situations can give rise to a finding of duress.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the best interests of the child, the
court concluded that the family court correctly held that the birth mother was
"incapable of giving a voluntary consent," and that the baby should be returned
to her.
In this case, Laura McCann, the birth mother, drove herself to the hospital to
56
give birth to her child in July of 2006.
At the time she gave birth, she was
experiencing what the court described as "emotional stressors" in her life,
including the fact that her boyfriend had died in a car accident in 2004, her father
had died from cancer in 2005, her pregnancy was the result of a rape, she hid the
pregnancy from almost everyone in her life because she was ashamed and
scared, and she had lost her job while pregnant when the restaurant that she
managed shut down.
Another major concern was that McCann was Catholic,
and in the Catholic Church, having children outside of marriage is viewed
unfavorably.
When she gave birth to a baby girl, McCann did not respond to
the child and one of the nurses was concerned about the lack of response, at
which point the obstetrician called for a social work consultation.5 9 McCann
was evaluated by several professionals, including Dr. Gorman, an obstetrician

54. See, e.g., id. at 385-86, 660 S.E.2d at 507 (demonstrating South Carolina's approach of
favoring a totality of the circumstances approach over a demarcated list of factors in assessing
duress).

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 390-91, 660 S.E.2d at 509-10.
Id. at 376, 660 S.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 376-77, 660 S.E.2d at 502.

58. See, e.g., Lawrence Catholic Academy Teachers FiredFor Out Of Wedlock Pregnancy,
CBS BOSTON (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2013/12/09/lawrence-catholicacademy-teachers-fired-for-out-of-wedlock-pregnancy/ (reporting that two Catholic high school
teachers were fired for announcing they were expecting children out of wedlock); The Defect of
Birth, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02579b.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2015) (discussing illegitimacy as a canonical impediment to ordination).

59.

McCann, 377 S.C. at 377, 660 S.E.2d at 502.
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who dealt with post-natal care; Judy Hewes, a social worker; and Dr. Srivastava,
who performed a psychological evaluation.60 Dr. Srivastava diagnosed McCann
at an emotional level between anxiety and depression, and found that she had a
"functioning level, or GAF score of 50, which meant partial insight." 6
After meeting with those professionals, McCann contacted Helen
Duschinski, the director of a private adoption agency, who agreed to meet with
62
her at the hospital the following morning. After this exchange, McCann asked
to see her baby and "appeared to bond with her baby."63
The next morning, Duschinski met with McCann to discuss the adoption,
and, apparently, McCann "believed Duschinski worked with the Department of
Social Services and would explain the process." 64 McCann filled out paperwork
that included a document on counseling, and after filling out this paperwork with
65
McCann, Duschinski left.
Rock Corley, attorney for the adopting Does, and
Hector Esquivel, the attorney in charge of presenting McCann with the consent
66
form, entered the room.
Although Corley left while Esquivel went over the
consent form, Nurse Hewes stayed in the room as a witness, as part of the
statutory requirement for signing a consent form.67

Esquivel apparently went

over the consent form "line by line, trying to ensure that McCann understood the
form and that her consent was voluntary," and he explained that the only way to
revoke her consent would be to "go to court and explain the decision was made
under duress." 68 However, Nurse Hewes testified that Esquivel told McCann
that she could "go to court to prove she was the better parent in order to 'undo
it."'69

The Does filed for adoption on July 26, 2006, and McCann filed for reversal
of consent on the following day. 70 The court called an emergency meeting and
appointed a guardian ad litem for the baby. 7 After McCann amended her
complaint, the court called another temporary hearing, during which the court
granted McCann "limited, supervised visitation with the baby." 72 The family
court bifurcated the trial to decide first the issue of whether the consent was
voluntary, and then to decide whether revocation of the consent would be within

60. Id. at 377-78, 660 S.E.2d at 502-03.
61. Id. at 378, 660 S.E.2d at 503. A GAF score, or Global Assessment of Functioning score,
assesses the individual's psychological capacity to cope with psychological strain and hardship. See
Global Assessment of Functioning, ACCESS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, https://www.omh.ny.
gov/omhweb/childservice/mrt/globalassessment_functioning.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
62. McCann, 377 S.C. at 378-79, 660 S.E.2d at 503.
63. Id. at 379, 660 S.E.2d at 503.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 379, 660 S.E.2d at 503-04.
66. Id. at 379-80, 660 S.E.2d at 504.
67. Id. at 380, 660 S.E.2d at 504.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 381, 660 S.E.2d at 504.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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the best interest of the baby. 73 As to whether the consent was voluntary, the
family court found that McCann's emotional distress meant that "she could not
have voluntarily given her consent" because she was in an "unusual emotional
state" while at the hospital, "the guidance she received during her hospital stay
was not objective and reflective of a realistic approach," and the unclear
language in the forms together with the conversation between the nurse and the
attorney combined to leave McCann with the impression that she would be able
to revoke her consent.74 The family court found that these facts "created such
pressure or had such influence upon Plaintiff that her signing of the document
could not have been done voluntarily and that her signing was obtained under
duress or though coercion."
[T]hese circumstances left her with the view that she had no
reasonable
alternative to signing the Consent and
Relinquishment and practically destroyed her free will and
caused her to do an act not of her own volition and that her act
was not the result of rational judgment on her par [sic].,76
Following the court's holding that McCann's consent was not voluntary, the
family court determined that it was in the best interest of the baby for the court to
revoke McCann's consent and return the baby to her.
The adoptive family appealed, and both the South Carolina Court of Appeals
78
and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family court's ruling.
In
doing so, the South Carolina Supreme Court looked at whether the "totality of
the circumstances, including emotional stressors from four significant events and
McCann's confusion over the significance of the documents she signed, amounts
to signing the consent for adoption involuntarily or pursuant to duress or
coercion." 79 The court applied the definition of duress set forth in Phillips.so In
addition, the court said that duress is "viewed with a subjective test, looking at
the individual characteristics of the person allegedly influenced, and duress does
not occur if the person has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to
avail themselves of the altemative." 8' The court further noted that duress "is

73. Id.
74. Id. at 381, 660 S.E.2d at 504-05.
75. Id. at 381, 660 S.E.2d at 505.
76. Id. at 381, 660 S.E.2d at 505.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 382, 390-91, 660 S.E.2d at 505, 509-10.
79. Id. at 383, 660 S.E.2d at 505.
80. "Duress is defined as 'a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or
influence that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or form a
contract not of his own volition."' Id. at 385, 660 S.E.2d at 506-07 (quoting Phillips v. Baker, 284
S.C. 134, 137, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 385, 660 S.E.2d at 507 (citing Blejski v. Blejski, 325 S.C. 491, 498, 480 S.E.2d
462, 466 (Ct. App. 1997)).
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only one consideration," and that there are other factors the court may look at,
"including the totality of the circumstances," to make the voluntariness
determination.82 The court acknowledged that in this case, it gave "great
deference to the family court's credibility determinations of the conflicting
evidence," and further stated that there was "abundant evidence that McCann's
emotional stressors and suffering caused impaired functioning." 83 Particularly,
the court pointed to the testimony of hospital staff, who were concerned about
McCann's safety and stated that her behavior prompted a psychological
consultation to make sure she could take care of herself in order to be released
from the hospital; the fact that her GAF score was only one point away from
"requiring further hospitalization"; and that the two professionals who evaluated
her ability to give consent for adoption testified that McCann was not capable of
"giving her voluntary consent for adoption at the time she was in the hospital." 84
The court also noted that there were several circumstances that made McCann
believe she had time to change her mind about giving consent, and, thus, the
85
totality of the circumstances showed that McCann's consent was involuntary.
All of these circumstances show that McCann certainly would have benefited
from either a forty-eight hour waiting period to sign the consent form or a period
to withdraw consent without having to prove duress or coercion. Had either of
these options been available to her, this litigation might not have been necessary.
Furthermore, the court agreed with the family court's view that placing the
child back with McCann was in the child's best interest. 86 Although it noted that
both sets of parents would be able to raise the child well, the court ultimately
decided that placing the child with her birth mother would be in the child's best
interest.8

7

Although McCann is a very involved and fact-specific case, the precedent it
creates for duress determinations indicates that it is very difficult to withdraw
consent under the current case law and statutes. This case is also critical because
one of the most notable aspects of the opinion, besides the definition of duress
that the court uses, is the section where the court discussed the possibility of a
"reflection period, during which biological parents could closely examine their
decision," as a measure that "would assure adoptive parents that the adoption
would likely be completed."
The court looked at both Georgia and North
Carolina's statutory law that provides for revocation of consent within a certain
amount of time without having to prove duress or coercion, 89 and highlighted
that "this relinquishment period allows a biological parent, usually the birth

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 385-86, 660 S.E.2d at 507.
Id. at 388, 660 S.E.2d at 508.
Id.
Id. at 388-89, 660 S.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 390, 660 S.E.2d at 509.
Id.
Id. at 384, 660 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 383, 660 S.E.2d at 505.
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mother, to contemplate her decision away from the physical and emotional
effects of giving birth." 90 The court said that this "reflection period" would be
beneficial because "the likelihood of a challenge to the consent after reflecting
during a revocation period would be substantially reduced." 9 1 The court also
mentioned that while prohibiting revocation of consent absent a showing of
duress or coercion is beneficial to adoptive parents, it does not "reduce the
heartbreak from prolonged litigation when a biological parent later changes his
or her mind."92 Although the court then goes on to apply South Carolina law,93
the fact that it deliberately chose to include this section in the opinion indicates
that the court would not, at least in theory, be opposed to a statute in South
Carolina providing for a period of revocation for birth parents.
Under these extraordinary facts, the court had little trouble finding that there
was indeed duress.94 Although this case is helpful in that it gives an example of
a situation in which the court would find that there is duress, it is unhelpful
insofar as it shows the high end of the spectrum, yet fails to give any guidance as
to what the minimum requirements would be for a showing of duress.
B. Duress
Finding duress is critical in many cases in which a birth parent wishes to
revoke consent for adoption. Therefore, it is important to understand how courts
decide what circumstances and facts are sufficient to constitute duress. In South
Carolina, as in many other states, finding duress is a fact-intensive inquiry, and
the standard that must be overcome for such finding is fairly high.9 5 It is a
"subjective" test,96 and statutes often provide little to no guidance on what

constitutes duress. Instead, it is up to judges to interpret the standard. For
example, in Georgia, duress must be something other than emotional or financial
instability; it must amount to pressure and coercion from others.97
In

90. Id.
91. Id. at 384, 660 S.E.2d at 506.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Justice Waller, the lone dissenting justice, would have held otherwise because he thought
that there was no evidence of external pressure, only internal stressors that were not enough to
justify revoking consent, and said that although McCann's decision to give up her baby for adoption
was supported by the people to whom she talked at the hospital, this support was not enough for the
court to find that her decision was involuntary. Justice Waller also pointed out that the consent form
fully complied with the statutory requirements, and since under the statute there is no waiting period
before such consent becomes effective, there was no other way for McCann to revoke her consent
other than by showing duress, which Justice Waller did not think was evidenced here. Id. at 391-95,
660 S.E.2d at 510-12 (Waller, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
95. Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 281
(2011).
96. McCann, 377 S.C. at 385, 660 S.E.2d at 507.
97. Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760, 762-63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Tidwell v. Critz,
282 S.E.2d 104, 107 (Ga. 1981); King v. Lewis, 4 S.E.2d 464, 468 (Ga. 1939)).
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Washington, a "lack of full understanding of the consequences, coupled with
inexperience, emotional stress, uncertainty and indecisiveness are insufficient
findings to allow repudiation of the surrender." 98
In a Mississippi case, the court did not find that there was duress even
though, in the dissent, some of the judges emphasized that an unmarried minor
who gives birth to a child and then moves in to the home of the prospective
adoptive couple is subject to strong emotional pressure to give up the child,
especially in light of the fact that she was promised significant contact with the
child after the adoption, was not represented by independent legal counsel, and
did not recognize the enormity of the decision she made when she signed the
consent form and relinquished her parental rights. 99
What is the purpose of such a high standard for finding duress in adoption
consent signings? One reason for having a high standard difficult to overcome is
that courts generally want there to be finality and stability in adoptions,
particularly when adoptive parents have relied on the birth parent's consent and
have formed a bond with the child. Additionally, it is important that courts
always look to the best interest of the child when making decisions in adoption
cases. Courts want the child to be in a settled home, and having a high standard
of duress helps ensure that the child settles into a suitable home, instead of being
bounced around among families. Therefore, a high standard of duress that
makes it difficult for a birth parent to revoke consent seems to ensure that both
finality and the best interests of the child are served. However, duress is a
subjective test, and although it is the current standard, a better option would be to
have a short revocation period to withdraw consent or a waiting period before
signing consent, so that the duress standard would be a last resort instead of the
only option for birth parents.
IV. OVERVIEW OF OTHER STATES AND THE UNIFORM ACT

A.

Withdrawal Periods in Different States

Currently, other states have statutory withdrawal periods. Some states
structure this withdrawal period according to a set amount of days. These states
include Alaska and Georgia with ten days, 00 California and Maryland with thirty
days,1ol and North Carolina with seven days.102 Some states, instead of
prescribing a set amount of days for a birth parent to withdraw consent, measure
the revocation period by other means. Missouri simply provides that consent

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

In re Adoption of Baby Girl K, 615 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So.2d 690, 711-12 (Miss. 2003).
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.070(b) (2012).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(a)(1) (West 2013).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-608(a) (2013).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss4/7

12

Rischbieter: Addendum to Adoption: Adjusting the Adoption Statutes in South Ca
2015]

FAMILY LAW

853

may be withdrawn up until the adoption has been approved by a judge.1 03
Texas's statute very boldly states that "[a]t any time before an order granting the
adoption of the child is rendered, a consent
required by Section 162.010 may be
04
revoked by filing a signed revocation."'1
Other states, instead of having a statutorily explicit policy on withdrawal of
consent, rely on case law and a judicial creation of a withdrawal period. One
such example is Oregon, a state that invokes a series of cases dealing with the
105
revocation of consent to complement its adoption statutes.
In Adoption of
Camarilla, the Supreme Court of Oregon, for the first time, established that a
birth parent may withdraw consent.106 More than a decade later, the manner in
which a birth parent in Oregon may withdraw consent was clarified by the court
in In re Adoption ofLauless, where the court noted that the right of a birth parent
was not absolute, 0 7 and that a birth parent could be estopped from withdrawing
consent if that was in the best interest of the child.1os Pennsylvania has a similar
line of case law, under which it is now well settled that "'consent to adoption by
the natural parent may be withdrawn at any time before entry of the final decree
of adoption."1 09
A look at South Carolina's neighboring states, North Carolina and Georgia,
can provide some insight into a possible period of withdrawal that our legislature
should consider. Having provisions that are similar to surrounding states would
help in situations involving interstate adoptions.
North Carolina General Statutes section 48-3-608 (a) provides that a birth
parent may withdraw consent after signing the consent form relinquishing rights
to an unborn child or a minor child within seven days by providing written notice
to the person specified in the consent form.11 0 In addition, the birth parent does
not have to show duress in order for the revocation to be effective,"' although
section 48-3-609 does provide that consent for adoption will be void if the birth
parent can prove that the consent was obtained through fraud or duress,1 12 a
slightly different standard than in South Carolina.

103. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.030(6) (2014). The statute further provides that consent for
adoption may not be given until the child is forty-eight hours old. Id. § 453.030(5). There is
currently a bill in the Missouri legislature to change the forty-eight hours to twenty-four hours. H.B.
546, 98th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.011 (West 2013).
105. See Stubbs v. Weathersby, 892 P.2d 991, 999 (Or. 1995) (citing In re Adoption of
Lauless, 338 P.2d 660, 662 (Or. 1959); Adoption of Capparelli, 175 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Or. 1946)).
106. Capparelli,175 P.2d at 154-55.
107. Lauless, 338 P.2d at 664 (citing Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 37, 64 S.E.2d 19, 22
(1951); Note, ParentalRight to Withdraw Consent in Adoption Proceedings, 30 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
75, 79 (1955)).
108. Id. at 665.
109. K. N. v. Cades, 432 A.2d 1010, 1014-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (quoting In re Adoption of
R. W. B., 401 A.2d 347, 349 n.2 (Pa. 1979)).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-608(a) (2013).
111. See id. (reciting the procedure for revocation without mentioning duress).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-609(a)(1).
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Similarly, Georgia's statute provides a period of ten days during which
consent may be withdrawn without having to show duress or coercion.113
As a point of comparison to the myriad state laws on revocation of consent
for adoption, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Adoption
Act of 1994.114 Among other provisions, the Commission, in section 2-408,
listed three specific criteria for birth parents to revoke consent.' 1 5 In addition to
proving that the consent was procured under duress or coercion,1 6 the Act also
provided that consent could be revoked if the birth parent and the adoptive
parents both agreed to the revocation. 1 7 Perhaps most importantly, the Act
provided for a period of 192 hours (8 days) after the birth of the child and after
consent was given during which the birth parent could withdraw consent, as long
as the birth parent notified the adoptive parents or the adoptive parents' lawyer
in writing." 8 Although this Act has only been adopted in Vermont,11 9 it is still
noteworthy that the Commission would include such a withdrawal provision in
an Act that is meant to synthesize and promote ideal adoption laws across the
states.
V.

WHY SOUTH CAROLINA SHOULD REVISE ITS ADOPTION LAWS

Although the duress standard is currently South Carolina's method of
ensuring the finality of adoptions and the protection of children in the adoption
process, it is, at best, an imperfect method. In light of the high standard of
duress that birth parents must overcome in order to revoke consent, the large
number of cases where birth parents wish to withdraw their consent, and the fact
that many states approve of a limited time during which a birth parent may
revoke consent without a showing of duress or involuntariness, a period of
revocation of twenty-four hours would be a beneficial change to South
Carolina's statutory law. In addition, a law that provides that a birth parent
could not give consent until a certain amount of time after giving birth, perhaps
twenty-four to forty-eight hours, would help ensure the finality of a birth
parent's decision and further the goals of protecting the child's best interest.
Finally, requiring that the birth parent speak with an attorney about the
implications of giving consent to make sure that the birth parent understands
exactly what rights he or she is giving up would also be beneficial.

113. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-9(b) (2010).
114. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994).

Id. § 2-408.
Id. §2-408(b)(1).
Id. § 2-408(a)(2).
Id. §2-408(a)(1).
119. Legislative Fact Sheet Adoption Act (1994), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption Act (1994) (last visited Feb.
20, 2015).
115.
116.
117.
118.
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A statutory revocation period would be beneficial to the adoption process
because many birth parents suffer from feelings of regret after signing the
consent forms giving up a child for adoption, especially if done very soon after
giving birth.120 In her article Reproduction and Regret, Professor Susan
Appleton draws parallels between adoption and abortions, saying that giving a
child up for adoption can lead to feelings of regret similar to those that come
with having an abortion.121 A period during which consent may be withdrawn
might help reduce the feelings of regret that birth parents often experience, and
would help further the adoption system's goal of finality by ensuring that birth
parents have time to fully settle their minds on whether or not they want to give
up their child for adoption. Furthermore, the focus of the courts on the birth
mother's behavior, particularly if the birth mother is young or unmarried, which
is often the case in adoption cases,122 represents a sometimes unnecessary
injection of a judge's personal and subjective opinion that may represent a
critique of the birth mother's lifestyle or choice and not necessarily the best
interests of the child.123 Having a statutory withdrawal period would help keep
those kinds of opinions out of the determination of whether or not withdrawal of
consent is proper under the circumstances.
In her article, Elizabeth Samuels, citing numerous adoption cases, studies in
the United Kingdom, and advice from the Concerned United Birthparents'
(CUB) advocate group, theorizes that birth parents should not sign consent forms
too soon after giving birth to their children.1 24 She notes that CUB advises birth
parents not to sign consent forms while they are still in the hospital; rather, they
should wait until they are in a more formal legal setting so that they understand
their rights and do not make hasty decisions.1 25 The article also notes two
studies conducted in the United Kingdom that indicated that birth parents felt a
longer time to withdraw consent would be beneficial.126 Furthermore, in an
extensive analysis of a wide variety of adoption cases, Samuels concludes that
when birth parents consented to give their children up for adoption in the hours
or days after giving birth, such adoptions "were not conducted in ways that
facilitated deliberate and firm decisions." "In most of the cases, the mothers

120. See Appleton, supra note 95, at 278-86 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 278 (citing ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY
OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADE

53 (2006)).
122. See id. at 282 (citing FESSLER, supra note 121, at 182-85; RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS
AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN
THE UNITED STATES 69-70 (2001)).

123. Id.
124. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents to the
Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 539-41 (2005) (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 539-40 (quoting HEATHER LOWE, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW IF YOU'RE
CONSIDERING ADOPTING YOUR BABY § 10, available at http://www.cubirthparents.org/
docs/heather-lowes-booklet.pdf).
126. Id. at 540 (quoting JOHN TRISELIOTIS ET. AL., ADOPTION: THEORY, POLICY AND

PRACTICE 98 (1997)).
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received no counseling, and in almost all of them, they did not have legal
representation." 127 Those decisions were "soon regretted."1

28

As long as it is short, a statutory withdrawal period would not overly burden
the current adoption system. In fact, it could even potentially reduce the current
burden on the system because having a statutory withdrawal period could help
reduce litigation involving attempts to withdraw consent, as birth parents would
have a period of time to withdraw consent without going to court to prove that
there was duress or coercion present at the time they signed the consent forms.
As long as the withdrawal period remained short following the trend of the
other states with this type of revocation period-the child and the adoptive
parents would not have had a lengthy time to bond. A court action to withdraw
consent due to duress or coercion could prolong the placement of the child in a
home of any kind, as the court noted in McCann when it stated that "protections
need to be in place for both biological and adoptive parents to ensure the
decision to give a child for adoption is a thoughtful and certain one and not
likely to be challenged in a long, arduous, and emotionally-wrenching legal
process.',129 Furthermore, in her article, Samuels says that "no research or
historical experience suggests that a period of a few days to a few weeks in
foster care damages newborn babies who then return to their birth families or
move into secure adoptive placements"1 30 because babies do not begin to display
attachment behavior until the age of approximately six months.131 So, their
development would not be negatively influenced.132
By adopting a twenty-four hour withdrawal period, courts may be less likely
to run into problems concerning adoptive parents' reliance on consent, a concern
that is often at the forefront of adoption cases.133 Although there may be some
concern that adoptive parents may be reluctant to adopt if there is a revocation
period-a concern particularly worrisome to pro-adoption states like South
Carolina-as long as the new revocation period is short, it would not be
substantially different from current adoption law and would be unlikely to deter
most adoptive parents.
A revocation period would also not conflict with current statutory language
prohibiting the withdrawal of consent after the final adoption decree because,
presumably, a final adoption decree would not be filed twenty-four hours after
consent was given in a normal adoption proceeding, such as in McCann when
the adoption petition was not filed until five days after the consent form was
signed.1 34 As long as the birth parent filed for revocation of consent before the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 549.
Id.
McCann v. Doe, 337 S.C. 373, 390, 660 S.E.2d 500, 509 (2008).
Samuels, supra note 124, at 540.
See id. (citing 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 200-01 (2d. ed. 1982)).
See id. (citing 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 200-01 (2d. ed. 1982)).
See Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 37, 64 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1951).
McCann, 377 S.C. at 379-81, 660 S.E.2d at 503-04.
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final adoption decree was entered, the revocation period would still comply with
the current statutory requirements.1 35
Ultimately, providing a time period during which a birth parent can revoke
consent for adoption without proving duress, coercion, or involuntariness would
further the goal of providing the child with the most stable home, and thus would
fit squarely with the requirement that any outcome in an adoption proceeding
would be in the best interest of the child. There is a presumption in South
Carolina that "it is the best interest for the child to be placed with a biological
parent over a third party,"1 36 and allowing a birth parent the opportunity to
revoke consent for adoption and take the child back would be in line with that
presumption.
In addition to a revocation period, a statutory requirement prohibiting birth
parents from consenting to adoption until a certain amount of time has passed
since the birth of the child would also be beneficial. Even if they do not have a
revocation period, many states impose a waiting period after the birth of a child
before a birth parent can sign a consent form for adoption. For example, in West
Virginia, a birth parent must wait at least seventy-two hours after giving birth to
sign a consent form.137 In a case discussing this waiting period, the West
Virginia Supreme Court recognized that "the legislative policy behind the
seventy-two hour period was to provide the natural parent some protection
against a too hurried decision to relinquish her child at a time when the physical
and/or emotional stress of childbirth might limit or impair the parent's normal
reasoning ability."1 38 Pennsylvania, which allows birth parents to withdraw
consent before a final adoption decree has been entered, also requires birth
parents to wait at least seventy-two hours after the birth of a child before signing
a consent form for adoption.139 Combining a waiting period before consent can
even be given with a period in which a parent may revoke consent without
having to prove duress, coercion, or involuntariness would further assure that
birth parents are fully committed to giving their child up for adoption. There
would be less potential for regret on the birth parents' part on one hand as well
as less potential for disappointment of the prospective adopting parents if the
adoption does not go through on the other.
Finally, requiring that birth parents have access to independent legal
counsel-counsel solely representing them and not representing the adoptive
parents-would be beneficial because it would reduce the confusion that birth
parents sometimes have when it comes to understanding what exactly they are
giving up, as far as their legal parental rights toward the child are concernednamely, that they are giving up all parental rights-as well as help them

135. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-350 (2010).
136. McCann, 377 S.C. at 389, 660 S.E.2d at 509 (citing Moore v. Moore, 300 S.C. 75, 79,
386 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1989)).
137. Baby Boy R. ex. rel. Patricia R. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839, 841 (W. Va. 1989).
138. Id. at 842.
139. 23 PA. STAT ANN. § 2711(c) (West 2010).
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understand all provisions of the consent form as fully as possible.1 40
Additionally, having an advocate to solely represent the interests of the birth
parent and not the adoptive parent will hopefully reduce duress and coercion and
keep birth parents from succumbing to undue pressure from outside sources.
There is support for separate legal counsel among attorneys in the field, and
those supporters "emphasize the important nature of the adoption proceeding, the
typical imbalance of power between birth parents and adoptive parents, the
possibility of conflicts of interest, and the fact that many birth mothers change
their minds after the birth."141
VI. CONCLUSION

Although McCann gives some guidance to birth parents, adoptive parents,
attorneys, and judges in South Carolina as to what circumstances will constitute
a finding of duress, it is still a murky concept. A better solution would be to give
all parties involved bright-line rules that would help cut down on litigation to
begin with. To provide such bright-line rules and strengthen the protections
afforded to birth parents and adoptive parents alike, the South Carolina
legislature should enact legislation that (1) gives biological parents time to
revoke consent without proving duress, coercion, or involuntariness; (2) makes
biological parents wait for a certain amount of time before signing the consent
form; and (3) requires a biological parent to receive advice from a lawyer
unaffiliated with the prospective adoptive parents prior to signing any consent
form.
A withdrawal period during which a parent can revoke consent for adoption
without having to show that duress or coercion would be beneficial to the
adoption process in South Carolina because it would be in line with similar
provisions in neighboring states, cutting down on confusion and litigation
difficulties when children are adopted across state borders. There is judicial
support for this provision, as evidenced in McCann.142 Furthermore, a
revocation period would help ensure finality in adoption cases by providing
parents with a concrete, bright-line rule for a short period of time to withdraw
consent. In addition, since twenty-four hours is a short time, there would not
really be a chance for reliance and bonding by the adoptive parents, and it would
help reduce the burden on courts by reducing the need to go to court and get
judicial consent for withdrawal. Finally, a statute of this nature would still be
consistent with the goal of providing a stable home in the best interests of the
child.
A similar line of reasoning supports requiring birth parents to wait for a
certain amount of time-perhaps twenty-four to forty-eight hours before

140. See Samuels, supra note 124, at 537-38.
141. Id.
142. McCann v. Doe, 377 S.C. 373, 384, 660 S.E.2d 500, 506 (2008).
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signing the consent form, as it would give birth parents time to bond with the
child and see if adoption still is the route they wish to pursue.
Finally, requiring that birth parents discuss the consent form and the
adoption process with independent legal counsel not affiliated with the
prospective adoptive parents would help ensure that birth parents are fully
cognizant of the ramifications of signing the consent form, the time at which
such consent becomes completely irrevocable, and the exact rights they are
giving up when they relinquish their child for adoption. In short, these statutory
provisions will go a long way towards fixing the confusing and uncertain
adoption system currently in place in South Carolina.
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